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28 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Additional Inspector General Conclusions
on Cuban Arms Build-up

1. You have asked what additional conclusions we have reached
since starting on the report to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.

2. The conclusions stated on Page 41 of our report to you
are as follows:

      a. That, with a few minor exceptions, intelligence
information on the Cuban arms build-up moved rapidly to
those officers who needed it;

      b. That limited use was made of the information
available because of publication restrictions, which were
aggravated by coordination problems, and, because officers,
in CIA as well as other agencies, were skeptical of refugee
and agent reporting, that this skepticism may have delayed
the community's realization of the true significance of the
Cuban arms build-up;

      c. That the estimative process failed because the
estimators were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might
install offensive weapons in Cuba or that they would grossly
underestimate United States ability to detect an offensive
build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution; and

      d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights,
following [ ] affected the
planning of Cuban reconnaissance flights during September 1962.

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3. During our work on the report to the President's Board, we
have formed some supplementary and additional tentative conclusions.

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They follow:

     a. Prior to early October, concern over the possibility of an offensive threat in Cuba came to a focus only in the person of the DCI acting as an individual intelligence officer. Publication of intelligence on offensive possibilities might have spread a more timely alarm.

     b. The full force of the DCI's concern was never communicated to intelligence analysts.

     c. The ban on publishing intelligence about offensive weapons in Cuba had several bad effects. Among them were:

     (1) It inhibited analysis because, though the analysts were not denied access to raw information on offensive capabilities, they were not obliged, were in fact forbidden, to turn it into published intelligence. Because there were no publishing deadlines to face in dealing with this information, analysis may have been delayed. Analysis was fragmented by compartmentation due to the publishing ban; analysts in the various offices and agencies had the same raw information to work on, but they were deprived of a common forum for discussion of it.

     (2) The Unified and Specified Commands did not receive intelligence (as distinguished from raw information) on the offensive build-up because of the publishing ban and because of the [   ] System which was imposed on 13 October. These commands were responsible for contingency planning and were charged with operational responsibilities with respect to Cuba. These commanders were called to Washington and briefed on 16 October.

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     d. There had been many reports of offensive missile activity in Cuba, none of which had been substantiated and many of which had been disproved. Intelligence officers had therefore become skeptical of such reporting.

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e. What the Soviets were doing in Cuba was unprecedented. They had never done it before. Many intelligence officers, accustomed to predicting the future on the basis of the past, simply believed it couldn't happen. This view was not limited to the estimators.

f. The community had come to place over-reliance on its technical tools. The result was a reluctance to believe the reports of ground observers without hard photographic evidence.

J. S. Earman
Inspector General

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